asks a reader: "... At this point do not know how Gabriel can reconcile with Popper or Feyerabend Mises." Answering
:
Mises POPPER (In Nomoi, February 2009, https: / / www.ufm.edu/uploads/NOMOI_01_09.pdf)
1. Introduction and methodology used. Recently
interesting proposals have been written at bringing together the two great minds thinking that "a priori" not seem to have nothing to do: Mises and Popper. At least, from what I have seen recently, and witnessed by Ivo Sarjanovic reflections, Francesco Di Iorio, and Rafe Champion. Since Mises and Popper are two authors whom I have devoted much of my studies, epistemology, I would like intentio auctoris, put my two cents on the issue, which I hope not, lectoris intentio in a grain of confusion.
But precisely, intentio auctoris (what the author meant) and intentio lectoris (what the reader reads) is the methodology we used in this short article. Very much influenced by current hermeneutics (Eco, Gadamer) confess our great skepticism about achieving certainty what an author meant, or at least usually tries (we are not referring to any of the authors cited) , that is, quotes that would free themselves of interpretation, as if the history of thought achieve that "empirical" than the first inductivism intended, free of theory. Impossible. But this is not bad news: just leads to another type of intentio, intentio lectoris, where the reader is, first, aware that never goes out of interpretive assumptions, and, on the other, the reading of an author done to solve real problems rather than issues rated. And if we incline to the conjecture to certainty, in some authors, it is because we lived in your home (Heidegger) thing has little to do, again, with a positivism of texts of his thought. If that we are breaking rules normally practiced (Feyerabend) is because we think this is key to progress, we risk a regressive research program (Lakatos) and thank Nomoi authorities to allow us to so unusual procedure. Therefore, from here to the end the reader does not see any quotation or any other type.
2. Historical situation of both authors.
If the authors attempt to reconcile the differences between the two authors have to work so hard is that they are indeed very different. Mises
never left his basic training in the "human sciences" author Weber-style key to understanding historically Mises. Its passage by Menger emphasized not only its methodology to work the basics of the theory as the core of any social science, but also forever confirmed his two "enemies" basic positivism on the one hand, and historicism, on the other, against which continued to fight until his penultimate book in 1957, when the battle against German historicism was part of history of thought. Inductivism always considered possible in the field of natural sciences and Weberian neokantism inherited from the rejection of all metaphysics.
Popper was born in Vienna 21 years later, lived in another world ("world" in the sense Husserl / Gadamer). Their frame of reference, in its first 40 years or so, were the natural sciences, mathematics, positivism Circle Vienna, and his first confrontation with one of his central thesis, namely induction. Social issues appear on the horizon, at least in terms of academics (not on what life) between 1942 and 1944, when he wrote The Poverty of Historicism and the famous Open Society. The place he still holds the conjectural there does not seem to have much to do with certainty Misiana strong both economically and politically, and subsequent concerns Popper are, above all, the strengthening of their own method, on the one hand, their concerns regarding the evolution, quantum theory, the world 3, the universe, which, on the other, its discussions with Kuhn, Lakatos and Adorno. Relatively
obvious, at least prima facie, that the horizons of both authors and do not cross that had minimal notice of each other would create obvious misunderstandings.
3. The usual interpretation of both.
But, moreover, both authors have generated disciples to emphasize aspects of his thoughts that are too contradictory. Popper is customary to emphasize the conjectural of human knowledge, on the one hand (as the basis of both its epistemology and its political philosophy) and the importance of empirical testing, but not as induction and falsification. The Popper of the ethics of dialogue is barely mentioned (Artigas and Boland might be exceptions) and several His disciples consider Kuhn, Lakatos and Feyerabend more or less as signs of degeneration epistemology. For Mises, I believe that the "interpretation Rothbard is normal. The certainty of human knowledge, both in its point of departure and arrival at the point, admits no auxiliary hypothesis in the middle, empirical testing has nothing to do in social sciences and natural sciences if it is, the induction achieved since there are certain constants. Axiomatic-deductive method in social sciences, natural sciences inductive method, accuracy in both. On the side of Popper, hypothetical-deductive method in all the sciences, both conjectures. Obviously, both groups of followers have formed two churches, as would Feyerabend (Popper church and the church Misiana) where the mutual excommunication is obvious and where many followers clamoring for a legitimate right to pontificate and authentic interpretations of the authentic teachings of the Messiah .
4. The ambivalence of his writings.
But on top of problems, the "extremists" of both authors can be found in two quotations that apparently support their interpretation. It would be very interesting, and worthy of the method that we are following is the complete list of citations which Mises enthroned the accuracy of the starting points of the deduction and the findings in economics, and compares it with math. And the strongest texts about works not marginal, they are in Human Action and the two specifically devoted to the epistemology of economics: Epistemological Problems and The Ultimate Foundation. On the side of Popper, the texts that emphasize the conjectural as the core of human knowledge not only of physics are endless, just as he happens to texts that speak of the importance of empirical falsification.
Of course, the interesting thing is that these texts alongside other texts that have similar or moderate, or put under stress, or enrich, or to inconsistent (there every reader will say ... ..) the author's thinking. For Mises, his references to the "real world conditions" have been the cross of its performers, especially since he puts a condition to continue deducting .... His reference to the trends (not necessary) for employers to explain the market process, to psychological factors (not praxeological) in the case of banking systems, to manage expectations for the cycle theory .... And that to talk about the theoretical part: in its letters of situation, the "lost papers", as adviser to the Viennese Chamber of Commerce, references to the specific circumstances, including numbers, are permanent, Just as in his seminal book The Theory of money and credit, without specifying, by Mises, if this "castle" with the specific circumstances are necessary conditions for the production I corroboration of the theory. Similarly happening in their specific policy proposals and in its monetary reform proposal 52 or its reform proposal for Mexico, 43. Of course any "Misesian practitioner" we can say that .... But the matter is that the text did not say ....
For Popper, ibid. His references to his own metaphysical research programs, the empirical falsifiability is not the same and the certainty of them (I mean the certainty and empirical falsifiability not realism, free will, the World 3, indeterminism, logic ...), his famous principle of rationality in social science, its ethics of dialogue, rational attitude as moral order, its important reference to the interpretation and theory charge any empirical basis (subject to which we will return) .... Are all issues that seem to get away from the unequivocal Popper conjectures and refutations, which seemed almost only Hempel except falsifiability. Back: richness of thought or mere inconsistency? What "text" can answer the question?
5. Pleas of ambivalence.
But why, in both cases, this "split personality", which both can lead to confusion? We believe that in both cases, the authors visualized an interaction between theory and world "much deeper than their linguistic tools (inherited in turn from their historical horizons, point 2) allowed them to explain and express. For Mises, there was a management style Menger concrete reality, where the definition of the concept in question was a necessary condition to manage in the real world of complex phenomena ("complex phenomena" is an expression of Mises in Action Humana). Why then is handled as much comfort as circumstances economist. For Popper, the claim that all experience "empirical" (whatever it is) is full of theory leads to a conception of science where they always should be handled with a theory "a priori". This is the fundamental coincidence, not attempted, the two authors, and Sarjanovic, Di Iorio and Champion never tire of stress. In other words, both authors argue that any theory is "somehow" a priori. But, to defend that position, did not notice (both) that were introduced in the core of phenomenology and hermeneutics that, if they knew, it was from the negative preconceptions continental metaphysics inspired them. Then go to the next point.
6. The hermeneutic leap in both authors.
Let's start with the simplest. Mises said that empirical testing is impossible in social sciences. Obviously, because he was referring to empirical testing as it inductivism understands that it is impossible starting from the natural sciences. Boettke and Ebeling had seen this clearly, how long ago it was dedicated to these things taken by the hand and Hermeneutics by Don Lavoie Lachmann. And Popper, of course, would have coincided. If empirical testing is understood that an induction will be "proof" of the hypothesis, this is impossible in all the sciences. Hayek explicitly set this teaching in his preface to Studies in 1967.
But I can tell, Popper argues empirical testing and falsification. Yeah, sure, but the empirical testing: a) has an empirical base that is already interpreted by the theory that you want to falsify (or vicious circle .... The hermeneutic circle?), B) is not necessary from a logical point of view. When Popper defends itself from accusations of falsifiability naive (released mainly by the poor little children Kuhn, Lakatos and Feyerabend) Duhem thesis asserts the same sympathetic he found nothing in its early stages. Falsification is not necessary because it is the negation of a set of n + n guess initial conditions. So what about empirical testing? Popper could not go further. Lakatos attempted to distinguish empirically progressive program of another regressive, but to the incisive criticism of his friend Feyerabend had to admit that one could stay in a regressive research program "always to recognize the risk with which Feyerabend had more arguments for the own: it is not empirical testing, but to proceed counter-inductively re-interpret the world according to a theory that "seems" right. But this is not very different of continental hermeneutics: the horizon of pre constitutes the world could not be "refuted" by him. That any theory is a priori is in this sense as saying there is no bare facts of performance. Always "see" through a theory (Husserl), "world" (Husserl), "Horizon" (Gadamer), Popper called "speculation," Kuhn's "paradigm", Lakatos 'program' and Feyerabend "contrainductivo proceed." If not, we are blind. All theory, of course, you can "criticize", "counter" from another theory. But is it not It something that Mises had accepted the axioms for the deductive chain me? Was not that the defense does Mises Machlup when accused Hutchison of dogmatic and ideological priori? "And is not what Popper said last permanently critical rationality and the dialogic attitude?
latter is important because the entire world view can be criticized but not necessarily. Horizons, worlds, paradigms, beliefs (Ortega) did not criticize themselves. This is not bad news from the point of view that's why entering crisis (Kuhn). But from an ethical standpoint, then yes these distinctions are important: natural attitude and theoretical attitude (Husserl), communication, understanding, of horizons (Gadamer), dialogic approach (Popper). That is the lasting legacy of Popper's critical to incorporate in our worldviews. And in that sense Boland is right: it is important that the Socratic Popper Popper methodologist.
But, returning, there is no empirical testing as facts vs. theories, even in the sense that the first empirical falsifiability Popper, and fortunately "warned" by Popper himself to be "theory-laden." What we have is theory and critical theory from the theory itself or from another. That is what made Copernicus to Ptolemy. There are no "facts" to verify or refute theories. The optical illusion occurs because otherwise we fail to see the interpretation of social and physical world we constantly from our theoretical horizons. But it was obvious to the continental hermeneutic with which Mises and Popper were unfortunately cut off (and vice versa), and this is what Kuhn Koyré and spent all his life to explaining the natural sciences.
Therefore, what unites both writers completely is that both were, within the limitations of their own paradigm, a central hermeneutical issue, and have had no problem giving this "hermeneutic leap" that placed well both outside and in front of his own time. The best thing that could make his followers to continue this path, rather than become priests of new religions academic.
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